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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Does the Utah Industrial Commission lack jurisdiction to 
make an award of workers' compensation benefits when the 
Applicant failed to file a claim for compensation within three 
years of Applicant's accident, when neither Applicant's employer 
nor an insurance carrier has provided either compensation or 
medical treatment, and when Applicant's injury was not latent? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is de novo. Appellants, United 
Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, have been 
substantially prejudiced by the Industrial Commission's acting 
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute and erroneously 
interpreting and applying the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-
16(4)(b) and (d). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, 
as amended in 1981). 
(See addendum for text.) 
Utah Workers' Coiapensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-100 (1953, 
as amended in 1981). 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment, the employee shall file 
with the commission, in writing, notice of such accident, 
with a copy to the employer; if such notice is so filed 
ii 
within three years of the time of the accident or within the 
time limitation provided in section 35-1-99, the commission 
shall obtain jurisdiction to make its award when the injury 
becomes apparent. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1953) and Rule 14 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990). 
On October 18, 1988, Respondent Kyle Lyman filed a claim for 
compensation with the Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission). 
The injury for which Respondent sought compensation occurred on 
or about July 22, 1981, while Respondent was employed by 
Appellant United Parcel Service (UPS). The Commission, through 
Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen, concluded that the 
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim and 
awarded benefits to Respondent. On March 5, 1990, the Commission 
denied Appellants1 Motion for Review of the ALJ's decision. 
Appellants now appeal the Commission's conclusion that the 
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Kyle Lyman alleges that on or about July 22, 1981 
he suffered an industrial accident during the course of his 
employment with UPS. Respondent did not notify UPS and/or 
• t • in 
Liberty Mutual of the alleged injury, however, until September 8, 
1981, when Respondent entered the hospital to undergo disc 
surgery. Respondent was at this time employed by an employer 
other than UPS. 
On October 5, 1981 Liberty Mutual sent a letter to 
Respondent denying Respondent's claim for workers1 compensation. 
Liberty Mutual further notified Respondent that if he disagreed 
with Liberty Mutual1s decision, he had the right to petition the 
Industrial Commission for a hearing. Liberty Mutual gave the 
address and phone number of the Industrial Commission and told 
Respondent that he had three (3) years from the date of his 
accident in which to file the request. At no time did UPS or 
Liberty Mutual pay compensation, medical expenses or any other 
benefits to Respondent. 
Although Respondent called the Industrial Commission, he did 
not file a request for a hearing until October 18, 1988—over 
seven (7) years from the date of injury. 
In awarding benefits to Respondent, the Industrial 
Commission, through Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy C. 
Allen, found that Respondents injury was an industrial injury 
suffered during Respondents course of employment with UPS. The 
Commission further concluded that the Industrial Commission had 
jurisdiction to make an award of compensation. On March 5, 1990, 
iv 
the Commission denied Appellants1 Motion for Review of the ALJ's 
decision. 
Appellants now appeal the Commission's conclusion that the 
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim. 
v 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Respondent's Claim for Compensation is Barred Under the 
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
The Utah Workers1 Compensation Act requires that an injured 
worker file a claim for compensation with the Industrial 
Commission within three years from the date of the accident or 
the last date on which compensation was received. While there 
are exceptions which excuse the failure to file within the three 
year period, Respondent's case does not fall within any of these 
exceptions. As Respondent failed to file his claim for 
compensation within the three year period, his claim is barred 
under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
II. The Three-Year Filing Requirement Becomes Meaningless 
If Jurisdiction Requires Neither Satisfaction of the 
Requirement Nor an Exception to the Requirement 
The Utah legislature has required that an injured worker 
file a claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission 
within three years from the date of the accident. The 
legislature has also recognized certain exceptions to the three-
year requirement. To grant jurisdiction when neither the three-
year filing requirement nor one of the exceptions has been 
satisfied would render the legislature's three-year requirement 
meaningless. 
vi 
ARGUMENT 
I. Respondents Claim for Compensation Is Barred Under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
A. Mr, Lyman Failed to File a Claim for Compensation 
Within Three Years of His Accident 
Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
contains the twin elements that are necessary to set in action an 
injured employee's right to compensation and benefits. Dean 
Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 1984). 
Those elements are: (1) Notice of injury, and (2) Claim for 
compensation. Id. While the notice of injury is normally given 
to the employer, the claim for compensation is normally filed 
with the administrative agency. 2 A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law. § 78.10 (1983). 
The first sentence of § 35-1-99 requires that the employee 
give notice to the employer of the time and place where the 
injury occurred. The second sentence requires that the employee 
give such notice within one year from the date of the accident or 
injury. The purpose of the "notice of injury" requirements is 
twofold: "[F]irst, to enable the employer to provide immediate 
medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the 
seriousness of the injury; and second, to facilitate the earliest 
possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury." 
Morse, 692 P.2d at 781 (quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmenfs 
1 
Compensation Law, § 78.20 (1983)). 
The third sentence of § 35-1-99 provides that all rights to 
compensation shall be barred if no claim for compensation is 
filed with the Commission within three years after the accident 
or the last date the employee received any compensation. Morsef 
692 P.2d at 781. The three-year limitation for filing a claim 
for compensation "protect[s] the employer against claims too old 
to be successfully investigated and defended." 2 A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.10 (1983). As time passes 
following an accident, records are destroyed, witnesses move away 
and memories fade. Without the three-year limitation, the 
employer is prejudiced in defending the case. 
In the present case, Mr. Lyman has received no compensation 
from either UPS or Liberty Mutual. Thus, the three-year filing 
period began to run on July 22, 1981—the date of Mr. Lymanfs 
accident. By filing his claim for compensation on October 18, 
1988—over seven (7) years from the date of the accident—Mr. 
Lyman has failed to comply with the three-year limitation. 
During the time between the date of the accident and the date of 
filing, several incidents have occurred which affect Appellants1 
ability to effectively investigate and defend the case. 
For example, medical records have been destroyed in 
accordance with normal record retention practices. Mr. Richard 
2 
Johnston, Mr. Lymanfs employer at the time Lyman first reported 
his injury, has moved from the state. The memories of witnesses 
have faded due to the number of years that have passed. 
Appellants1 ability to investigate, prepare and defend their case 
is thus prejudiced by Lymanfs failure to comply with the three-
year limitation. Unless Mr. Lyman qualifies for an exception to 
the three-year filing requirement, his claim is barred under the 
terms of § 35-1-99. 
Possible exceptions to the three-year filing requirement 
include: (1) the § 35-1-99 tolling of the period for filing a 
claim, (2) the § 35-1-100 "latent injury" exception, and (3) the 
"informality principle," which recognizes that a claim for 
compensation need not bear any particular formality. Mr. Lyman's 
situation does not fit into any one of these exceptions and thus 
his claim is barred under § 35-1-99. 
B. The Period for Filing a Claim for Compensation Has 
Not Tolled 
In 1981, the Utah legislature codified a tolling exception 
to the § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement. Kennecott Corp. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The pertinent language of the 1981 amendment reads: 
[T]he filing of a report or notice of accident or 
injury with the Industrial Commission, the employer or 
its insurance carrier, together with the payment of any 
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical 
treatment by the employer or an insurance carrier, 
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shall toll the period for filing such claim [for 
compensation]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, as amended in 1981) (emphasis 
added) • 
There are two important distinctions in the 1981 statute: 
(1) The distinction between cases where benefits are paid by the 
employer or insurance carrier vs. cases where no benefits are 
paid, and (2) the distinction between a claim for compensation 
vs. a notice of injury. 
The distinctions are important for two reasons. First, 
tolling of the three-year period takes place only when benefits 
have been paid. Tolling under the 1981 statute clearly requires 
(1) the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury with 
the Industrial Commission, the employer or the employerfs 
insurance carrier, together with (2) the payment of any 
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by 
the employer or an insurance carrier. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 
(1953, as amended in 1981). If no benefits are paid, the three-
year rule "wholly bar[s]" any claim for compensation filed after 
three years from "the date of the accident or the date of last 
payment of compensation." Id. 
Second, the "claim for compensation"/"notice of injury" 
distinction is important because of the clarification which it 
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lends to court interpretations of the pre-1981 statute. As the 
Utah Court of Appeals noted in Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), "The Utah Supreme 
Court has interpreted the former version of section 35-1-99 in 
several recent cases.11 The Court of Appeals then discusses those 
cases: Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982); 
Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984); 
Mecham v. Industrial Comm'n. 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Mannes-
Vale. Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986). Indeed, even 
Kennecott involved application and interpretation of the pre-1981 
language: "This version [pre-1981] of the statute is controlling 
in this case." Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 308. 
Each of these cases is a "notice of injury" case. That is, 
in each case, an injured employee failed to file a claim for 
compensation within the statutorily required three-year period. 
The Industrial Commission nonetheless had jurisdiction to hear 
the cases because of the "notice of injury" exception which 
tolled the three-year period for filing. The Dutson. Morse, 
Mecham, Mannes-Vale and Kennecott courts held that the employers1 
first report of injury, along with certain other documents, 
constituted sufficient notice to the Industrial Commission to 
invoke the Commission1s jurisdiction. 
Respondent Lyman's and the Industrial Commission's reliance 
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on these cases, however, is misguided* In each of these cases, 
the employer or the employer's insurance carrier had paid 
compensation or provided medical treatment. In 1981, the Utah 
legislature codified the results of these "notice of injury11 
cases, Kennecott, 740 P.2d at 308. The legislature clearly 
required the payment of compensation together with the notice of 
injury before tolling could occur. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 
(1953, as amended in 1981). Thus, in the pre-1981-language 
cases, the notice of injury exception was possible only because 
the employer or the employees insurance carrier had paid 
compensation to or provided medical treatment for the injured 
employee. 
In the present case, neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has paid 
compensation or provided medical treatment to Mr. Lyman. As 
there has been no payment, as required by the § 35-1-99 
exception, the exception is inapplicable to Mr. Lyman's 
situation. Thus, there has been no tolling of the three-year 
period for filing a claim for compensation. 
C. Mr. Lymanfs Injury Was Not a Latent Injury and 
Therefore Does Not Qualify for the Section 35-1-
100 Exception. 
Traditional workers1 compensation law recognizes that the 
failure to file a timely notice of injury may possibly be excused 
if the employer is not harmed by the lateness of the filing. 
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Such is not the case with a claim for compensation, lf[F]ailure 
to file a claim for compensation within the statutory period is 
not generally, apart from specific statute, excused by an 
argument that the employer was not harmed by the lateness of the 
filing.11 2 A. Larson, Workmenfs Compensation Law. § 78.20 
(1983). One of the excuses for a late claim for compensation is 
"latent injuries11 which "become apparent" after the statutory 
period for filing has passed. Larson at § 78.42. 
Section 35-1-100 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
represents Utah's statutory exception for the hidden or latent 
injury. The section states: 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment, the employee 
shall file with the Commission, in writing, notice of 
such accident, with a copy to the employer; if such 
notice is so filed within three years of the time of 
the accident or within the time limitation provided in 
§ 35-1-99, the Commission shall obtain jurisdiction to 
make its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-100 (1953, as amended in 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
This section provides an excuse for the employee whose 
failure to file a timely claim for compensation is solely because 
the injury is latent and does not "become apparent" until after 
three years has passed. If the employee originally filed a 
timely notice of injury, the Commission obtains jurisdiction over 
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the claim when the injury becomes apparent. The Utah legislature 
intended this section to be an exception to the three-year bar in 
§ 35-1-99. The section was not# however, intended to cancel the 
§ 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement. 
Sections 35-1-99 and -100 are to work together in protecting 
the right of an injured employee to obtain compensation. At the 
same time, they must also protect the employer's right to a 
timely, unprejudiced investigation of the employee's injury and 
claim. To allow § 35-1-100 to cancel the § 35-1-99 filing 
requirement in cases in which no latent injury is involved would 
be to entirely disregard the employer's right to timely 
investigation. 
In the present case, Mr. Lyman is not entitled to the § 35-
1-100 "latent injury" exception. Mr. Lyman's injury occurred on 
July 22, 1981. Surgery took place less than two months later, in 
September 1981. The results of the initial injury were clearly 
not latent. Nor has there been any subsequent development 
resulting from the 1981 injury which can be considered a latent 
injury. Mr. Lyman simply failed to comply with the § 35-1-99 
three-year filing requirement. 
Mr. Lyman's failure to comply was not due to unawareness or 
lack of understanding. On October 5, 1981, Liberty Mutual sent a 
letter to Mr. Lyman denying his claim for compensation. In that 
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letter, Liberty Mutual informed Mr, Lyman of his right to 
petition the Industrial Commission for a hearing. The letter 
further gave the address and phone number of the Commission and 
notified Mr. Lyman of the three-year filing requirement. Mr. 
Lyman called the Commission but made a conscious decision not to 
file a claim. Mr. Lyman clearly never intended to file a claim 
until October 18, 1988. 
Thus, as Mr. Lymanfs injury was not latent, he was not 
entitled to the § 35-1-100 "latent injury" exception. The 
Commission did not obtain jurisdiction over the claim when the 
injury became apparent because the injury became apparent well 
within the three-year filing period. Mr. Lyman had every 
opportunity to file within the statutory period. He should have 
filed. He could have filed. He simply chose not to do so. To 
allow jurisdiction under these circumstances would be to condone 
Mr. Lyman's conscious disregard for the statutory filing period. 
Furthermore, jurisdiction in this case would completely deny 
Appellants1 right to the protection afforded by the § 35-1-99 
three-year requirement. The Utah legislature never intended such 
unjust results when it enacted § 35-1-100. 
As Mr. Lyman's injury was not latent, he is not entitled to 
the § 35-1-100 exception. As he received no compensation or 
medical treatment from either his employer or the employer's 
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insurance carrier, the three-year filing period did not toll. 
Thus, as Mr. Lyman failed to file a claim for compensation within 
the three-year period, his claim is barred under § 35-1-99. 
D. UPS1 Original Report of the Accident, Along With 
Subsequent Medical Reports and Filings. Does Not 
Constitute a Claim for Compensation Under the 
Informality Principle 
The Utah courts have long recognized that a claim for 
compensation need not bear any particular formality. Utah State 
Ins. Fund v. Dutson. 646 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1982). Not every 
document filed with the Industrial Commission, however, qualifies 
as a valid substitute for a formal claim. MAt the minimum, the 
informal substitute for a claim should identify the claimant, 
indicate that a compensable injury has occurred, and convey the 
idea that compensation is expected." 3 A. Larson, Workmenfs 
Compensation Law, § 78.11 (1983). 
In Perdue v. Daniel Int'l, Inc., 59 N.C. App. 517, 296 
S.E.2d 845 (1982), petition for review denied, 299 S.E.2d 647, a 
claimant's employer filed an employee report form. The claimant 
also visited a doctor regularly for treatment. Thus, medical 
reports were also presumably filed with the Commission. The 
Commission wrote a letter to notify the claimant of the need for 
a formal claim. The claimant nonetheless failed to take any 
action until after the statutory two-year period had passed. In 
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holding the claim to be untimely, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals declared: 
There is no provision in the North Carolina Workmenfs 
Compensation Act requiring an injured employee to file 
a claim for compensation. . . . [T]he employer is 
required to report the accident . • . to the Commission 
on Form 19. 
Perdue, 59 N.C. App. 517, 296 S.E.2d 845 (1982) (quoting Hardison 
v. W.H. Hampton and Son, 203 N.C. 187, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1932)). 
In the present case, as in Perdue, the employer has filed a 
notice of injury with the Commission in compliance with its 
statutory duty. There have likewise been medical reports filed 
in compliance with statutory duty. These filings, however, do 
not qualify as substitutes for a formal claim for compensation. 
While the statutorily-required filings identify the injured 
employee and the nature of the accident, they do not indicate 
that a compensable injury hast occurred. Nor do the filings 
convey the idea that compensation is expected. Furthermore, Mr. 
Lyman knew, as did the claimant in Perdue, that he must file a 
claim with the Commission as a condition precedent to his right 
to compensation. Because of Mr. Lyman1s clear lack of intent to 
file a claim prior to October 18, 1988, along with the failure of 
the employer and medical reports to convey the idea that 
compensation was expected, the statutorily-required filings do 
not qualify as a substitute for a formal claim. 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals has ruled similar to the North 
Carolina Courtfs ruling in Perdue. Martin v. Industrial Comm'n. 
608 P.2d 366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979). In Martin, the employer of 
an injured employee filed a notice of injury with the Industrial 
Commission. Although the employee was wat least somewhat 
knowledgeable that compensation benefits were available11, Martin. 
608 P.2d at 368, he failed to file a claim for compensation 
within the prescribed time limit. The Industrial Commission held 
that the claim was barred. 
The claimant argued on appeal that the employerfs notice of 
injury gave sufficient information to the Commission, thus making 
the filing of a formal claim unnecessary. The Court of Appeals 
rejected the claimantfs argument and affirmed the Commissions 
finding that the claim was time-barred. In so holding, the Court 
quoted from A. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law: "At a 
minimum, the informal substitution for a claim should identify 
the claimant, indicate that a compensable injury has occurred, 
and convey the idea compensation is expected." 3 A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.11 The Court pointed out that 
the reports filed by the employer and the employer's insurer 
"[did] not assert that a compensable injury has occurred nor give 
notice that compensation is expected." Martin. 608 P.2d at 369. 
As already discussed above, the employer's statutorily-
12 
required notice of injury and the statutorily-required medical 
reports filed in the present case likewise fail to assert that a 
compensable injury has occurred or that compensation is expected. 
Thus, under Martin. Mr. Lyman's failure to file a timely claim 
for compensation is not excused by the Minformality principle.11 
The reports and notices filed by Mr. Lymanfs employer and doctors 
are simply insufficient to qualify as substitutes for a formal 
claim for compensation. 
In City and County of Denver (Denver Hy. Unit) v. Bush, 441 
P.2d 666 (Colo. 1968), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a 
claim for compensation filed twenty months after the claimant's 
injury was barred by a one-year statute because the late filing 
prejudiced the employer's right to fully investigate and mitigate 
the claim. The employer had notice of the injury, but had made 
no admission of liability. Furthermore, although the State 
Compensation Fund had paid the medical expenses for claimant's 
examination and drugs for treatment, no compensation was paid by 
the Fund. 
In holding the claim to be time-barred, the Colorado Supreme 
Court declared, "notice of the accident is not equivalent to 
notice of claim for compensable injury." Bush, 441 P.2d at 668. 
Indeed, the notice of the injury which the employer had received 
indicated that there was no claim for compensation. The employee 
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had continued to work following the alleged injury. Thus, the 
alleged injury — pain experienced as a result of lifting a mop 
bucket — appeared to be a noncompensable injury. 
In the present case, as in Bush, Mr. Lyman continued to work 
following his alleged industrial injury. He did not even report 
the bump to his hip while in the employ of Appellant UPS. 
Rather, UPS first learned of Mr. Lyman1s alleged injury almost 
two months later, when Mr. Lyman was no longer employed by UPS 
and when he was in the hospital awaiting surgery. 
As in Bush, Mr. Lymanfs injury appeared to be a 
noncompensable injury. That is, although Mr. Lyman suffered a 
bump to the hip, the actual problem for which Respondent was 
undergoing surgery appeared to have been the result of other 
incidents. Mr. Lyman had a history of muscle spasms and back 
problems experienced while in the Navy and as a result of 
athletic activity. Furthermore, Mr. Lymanfs surgery could have 
been the result of activities related to his employment at the 
time of seeking medical treatment. UPS simply did not receive 
its statutory right to provide medical treatment and attempt to 
mitigate Mr. Lymanfs injuries. Thus, UPS1 right to investigate, 
mitigate and defend this claim has been prejudiced by the lack of 
opportunity to be actively involved in attempting to treat and 
mitigate Mr. Lymanfs injury. 
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UPS1 right has been further prejudiced by Mr. Lymanfs delay 
in filing a claim for compensation. When UPS and Liberty Mutual 
denied Mr. Lyman's initial request for compensation, they 
informed Mr. Lyman of the need to petition a hearing with the 
Industrial Commission. It is this filing with the Commission 
which gives both the employer and the Commission the required 
notice that a claimant expects compensation. Absent this filing, 
an employer assumes that the employee has accepted the denial of 
the original request for compensation. Only when the employee 
files a claim for compensation with the Commission does the 
employer become aware of the need to further investigate the 
claim and defend the denial of compensation. 
In the present case, Mr. Lyman did not file a claim with the 
Commission until over seven years after the date of accident. 
While a 20-month delay prejudiced the employer in Bush, a seven-
year delay in the present case is clearly more severe. UPS had 
no idea that Mr. Lyman intended to pursue the matter further with 
the Commission until October 18, 1988. As UPS had neither 
acknowledged liability for Mr. Lyman%s injury nor waived its 
right to the § 35-1-99 three-year protection, it had for some 
time considered Lyman1s claim closed. Furthermore, in the seven 
year period, medical records had been destroyed, witnesses had 
moved and memories had faded. 
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UPS was clearly prejudiced in its ability to investigate, 
prepare and defend this claim. As the Bush court declared# 
"[N]on-prejudice to the employer is a necessary pre-requisite to 
the acceptance of [an informal, time-delayed] claim." Bush, 441 
P.2d at 667. The filing of the statutorily-required employer's 
notice of injury and physicians1 medical reports does not 
constitute a claim for compensation under the "informality 
principle." Mr. Lyman1s delay resulted in considerable prejudice 
to Appellants UPS and Liberty Mutual. To allow the statutorily-
required filings to satisfy the claim for compensation would be 
unfair to Appellants because of the prejudice. 
The Utah cases which recognize the informality principle are 
of no benefit to Mr. Lyman. Kennecott, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), Mannes-Vale. 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986), Mecham, 692 
P.2d 783 (Utah 1984), Morse. 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984), and 
Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), all recognize that a claim for 
compensation need not bear any particular formality. In 
approving of the informality principle, the Kennecott, Mannes-
Vale. Mecham and Morse courts cite to Dutson for recognition of 
the principle. 
In Dutson, the Utah Supreme Court held that an "Employer's 
First Report of Injury," an attending physician%s "Medical 
Report," and a "Notice: Payment of Temporary Disability 
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Compensation" filed with the Commission were sufficient to 
constitute a claim for compensation. Significantly, however, the 
Court declared: "[T]he documents filed confirm that: 1) 
Wholesale Cleaners and State Insurance Fund recognized liability; 
2) compensation and medical benefits were paid; and 3) payments 
of compensation and medical benefits would continue." Dutson. 
646 P.2d at 709. Based on the content of the filings, then, the 
Court found that the documents were "adequate . . . to confer 
jurisdiction upon the Commission." Id. 
Likewise, in Kennecott. Mannes-Vale, Mecham and Morse it was 
the content of the documents which allowed the Court to find 
jurisdiction in the Commission. In each of these cases, the 
employers had acknowledged some liability and there had been 
compensation. Furthermore, the employers had either indicated 
that compensation would continue or had "led a reasonable person 
to assume that no formal adversary action would be necessary to 
protect his rights." Mannes-Vale. 717 P.2d at 712 (quoting 3 A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.43(m), at 15-293 (1981)). 
The present case includes none of the factors which the Utah 
courts relied upon in Kennecott, Mannes-Vale. Mecham. Morse and 
Dutson. Neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has at any time 
acknowledged liability for Mr. Lyman1s injury. To the contrary, 
they have from the outset denied that Mr. Lymanfs bump to the hip 
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caused the injuries which resulted in Mr. Lymanfs September 1981 
surgery. Furthermore, neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has paid 
either compensation or medical benefits. Finally, UPS and 
Liberty Mutual have in no way indicated that compensation would 
be forthcoming or that formal adversary action would be 
unnecessary. Rather, Liberty Mutual made it clear in its October 
5, 1981 letter to Mr. Lyman that Mr. Lyman's request for 
compensation was denied and that Mr. Lyman would have to petition 
the Commission for a hearing if he (Mr. Lyman) wanted to 
challenge the denial. 
The content of the documents filed by UPS and by Mr. Lymanfs 
physicians in no way satisfies the requirements for an informal 
claim for compensation. The documents simply satisfy statutory 
duty by providing information about the nature of the injury. 
They do not indicate that a compensable injury has occurred. Nor 
do they indicate that compensation is expected by Mr. Lyman. As 
the documents do not qualify for the "informality principle" 
exception, Mr. Lyman's claim is subject to the § 35-1-99 three-
year requirement or other possible exceptions to the requirement. 
As we have already seen, Mr. Lyman does not qualify for 
either the § 35-1-99 tolling exception or the § 35-1-100 latent 
injury exception. Thus, Mr. Lyman's claim falls squarely within 
the requirements of the § 35-1-99 three-year rule. Mr. Lyman has 
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failed to comply with this rule. He knew of the need to comply. 
He had no obstacles or barriers to prevent his compliance. He 
simply failed to comply. His failure to comply indicates either 
a lack of intent to pursue the matter or a complete disregard for 
the statutorily-required filing requirement. In either case, as 
Mr. Lyman fails to fall under any of the exceptions to the three-
year requirement, his failure to comply results in the bar of his 
claim. 
As § 35-1-99 bars Mr. Lymanfs claim, the Industrial 
Commission has at no time obtained jurisdiction over this claim. 
The Industrial Commission's ruling to the contrary was thus in 
error and requires reversal by the Court of Appeals. 
II. The Three-Year Filing Requirement Becomes Meaningless 
If Jurisdiction Requires Neither Satisfaction of the 
Requirement Nor an Exception to the Requirement 
Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
requires the filing of both a notice of injury and a claim for 
compensation before an injured employee is entitled to 
compensation and benefits. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. 
Morse. 692 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 1984). While the notice of injury 
is normally given to the employer, the claim for compensation "is 
normally filed with the administrative agency.11 2 A. Larson, 
Workmenfs Compensation Lav. § 78.10 (1983). 
Section 35-1-99 bars an employee's claim for compensation if 
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the employee fails to file the claim within three years of the 
date of accident or the last payment of compensation. As 
discussed above, the Utah legislature has provided, and the 
courts have recognized, certain exceptions to the three-year 
filing requirement. One such exception is the § 35-1-99 "notice-
of-injury-plus-payment-of-compensation" tolling exception. 
In 1981, the legislature codified the results of several 
Utah cases interpreting the pre-1981 version of § 35-1-99. 
Kennecott v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). In those cases — Kennecott, Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse 
and Dutson — the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that the employers1 notice of injury, along with 
certain other documents and the employers1 payment of 
compensation, excused the injured employees1 late filing of a 
claim for compensation. The 1981 codification of the results of 
these cases reads: 
[T]he filing of a report or notice of accident or 
injury with the industrial commission, the employer or 
its insurance carrier, together with the payment of any 
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical 
treatment by the employer or an insurance carrier, 
shall toll the period for filing such claim [for 
compensation]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, as amended in 1981). 
As the 1981 amendment codifies the results of the pre-1981-
language cases, those cases are clearly "notice-of-injury" cases. 
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That is, filing a notice of injury, along with the payment of 
compensation, excuses an employeefs untimely filing of a claim 
for compensation by tolling the filing period. The notice-of-
injury tolling exception does not take the place of filing a 
claim for compensation. The injured employee must still file a 
claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission. The 
exception merely excuses a claim which is filed late but before 
eight years. 
To interpret Kennecott, Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and 
Dutson as "notice-of-claims" rather than "notice-of-injury" cases 
would render the three-year filing requirement of § 35-1-99 
meaningless. Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and Dutson do not hold 
that an employer's compliance with the § 35-1-97 filing of a 
notice of injury alone satisfies the § 35-1-99 requirement that 
the employee file a claim for compensation within three years. 
Under this "notice-of-claims" interpretation, the only time the § 
35-1-99 three-year requirement would bar an employee1s claim is 
when the employer fails to comply with the reporting requirement 
of § 35-1-97. 
Under Kennecott, however, not even the employer's failure to 
report an injury under § 35-1-97 will result in a § 35-1-99 bar 
of an untimely claim. In Kennecott, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the injured employee did not file a claim for compensation 
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with the Commission within three years of the date of his 
accident. Nor did the employer report the injury to the 
Commission as required by § 35-1-97. Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 309. 
The Utah Court of Appeals nonetheless held that the employeefs 
claim was not barred under § 35-1-99. The court reasoned that, 
"had the employer filed the required report of injury under 
section 35-1-97, the Commission would have been on notice." 
Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 309. The Court of Appeals refused to 
allow the employer's failure to comply with § 35-1-97 serve as a 
defense against the employee's untimely claim for compensation. 
Under a "notice-of-claim" interpretation, then, the § 35-1-
99 three-year filing requirement becomes meaningless. If under 
Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and Dutson, an employer's statutorily-
required filing of a notice of injury satisfies the three-year 
requirement. And under Kennecott. even the employer's failure to 
file satisfies the § 35-1-99 requirement. Then, under the 
"notice-of-claim" interpretation, there is no need for the 
employee to file a claim for compensation within three years of 
his accident. The § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement is 
erased. 
The Utah legislature never intended such a result. Sections 
35-1-99 and -100 clearly require that the employee file a claim 
with the Commission within three years from the date of accident 
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in order to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction. The "notice-
of-claim" interpretation of Kennecott, Mannes-Vale. Mecham, Morse 
and Dutson thus provides a result which is contrary to the 
legislature's intent. Such an interpretation is therefore 
inappropriate. 
The proper interpretation recognizes Kennecott. Mannes-Vale, 
Mecham. Morse and Dutson not as "notice-of-claim" cases, but as 
"notice-of-injury" cases. The courts1 finding of jurisdiction in 
those cases lay in the fact that the employers and the Commission 
had (or would have had, in Kennecott) notice of the employees1 
injuries. The notice of injury, combined with payment by the 
employer or the employer's insurance carrier, thus tolled the § 
35-1-99 filing period. The tolling of the filing period was an 
exception to the § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement — not a 
substitute for it. 
To find jurisdiction in the present case, where neither the 
statutory filing requirement nor an exception to the requirement 
has been satisfied, renders the statute meaningless. Such a 
result is clearly contrary to the legislature's intent and is 
inappropriate. Thus, the Industrial Commission's finding of 
jurisdiction was inappropriate and therefore requires reversal by 
the Court of Appeals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah Industrial Commission erred in finding that it had 
jurisdiction over Mr. Lymanfs claim. Mr. Lyman failed to satisfy 
the three-year filing requirement of § 35-1-99, and his claim 
does not qualify for an exception to the requirement. The Court 
of Appeals should therefore reverse the Industrial Commissions 
finding of jurisdiction over Mr. Lyman1s claim. 
DATED this I d<$ of June, 1990. 
JENSEN & mmi/L._ P.C, 
[M^ 
Denton M. Hatch 
Attorneys for Appellants 
United Parcel and/or 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, 
as amended in 1981): 
When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in the 
service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer 
of the time and place where the accident and injury 
occurred, and of the nature of the same, within 48 hours, 
when possible, or fails to report for medical treatment 
within said time, the compensation provided for herein shall 
be reduced 15%; provided, that knowledge of such injury 
obtained from any source on the part of such employer, his 
managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in 
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured 
sufficient to afford an opportunity to the employer to make 
an investigation into the facts and to provide medical 
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect 
or inaccuracy therein shall subject the claimant to such 
reduction, if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice 
the employer in making his defense, and the employer was 
not, in fact, so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice 
of the accident and injury is given to the employer within 
one year from the date of the accident, the right to 
compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for 
compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within 
three years from the date of the accident or the date of the 
last payment of compensation, the right to compensation 
shall be wholly barred; provided, however, that the filing 
of a report or notice of accident or injury with the 
Industrial Commission, the employer or its insurance 
carrier, together with the payment of any compensation 
benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by the 
employer or an insurance carrier, shall toll the period for 
filing such claim until the employer or its carrier notifies 
the Industrial Commission and employee, in writing, of its 
denial of liability or further liability, as the case may 
be, for the industrial accident or injury, with instructions 
upon said notification of denial to the employee to contact 
the Industrial Commission for further advice or assistance 
to preserve or protect the employee's rights; and provided 
further, that the said claim for compensation in any event 
must be filed within 8 years from the date of the accident. 
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